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Intentional and Unintentional Contributions to Nonspecific Preparation
During Reaction Time Foreperiods
Sander A. Los and C. Elisa Van Den Heuvel
Vrije Universiteit
The nonspecific preparation that follows a warning stimulus (WS) to speed responding to an impending
imperative stimulus (IS) is generally viewed as a strategic, intentional process. An alternative view holds
that WS acts as a conditioned stimulus that unintentionally elicits a tendency to respond at the moment
of IS presentation as a result of a process of trace conditioning. These views were contrasted as
explanatory frameworks for classical effects on reaction time of the duration and intertrial variability of
the foreperiod, the interval between WS and IS. It is shown that the conditioning view accounts for the
available data at least as well as the strategic view. In addition, the results of 3 experiments provide
support for the conditioning view by showing that unintentional contributions to nonspecific preparation
can be dissociated from intentional contributions.
It is generally agreed that people may enhance the speed and
accuracy of subsequent actions by means of preparation. There is
much less agreement, however, on the nature and mechanism of
preparation. The common view is that people regulate their pre-
paratory state in a voluntary way; that is, they preset mental
structures in accordance with their intentions before a stimulus
calls for action. However, recent empirical studies on shifting task
set have shown remarkable limitations in the role of intention in
the preparatory process (Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994; Meiran,
1996; Rogers & Monsell, 1995). These studies have shown that,
regardless of the duration of a preparatory interval, participants
obtain a lower preparatory state with respect to a specific task set
when that set differs from the task set used on the preceding trial
than when it is the same as the task set used on the preceding trial.
This led Allport et al. (1994) to suggest that the mental system is
subject to inertia, so that the preparatory state is at least partially
determined by recently performed actions.
In the present article, we extend this discussion to effects of
foreperiod (FP), the interval between a warning stimulus (WS) and
an imperative stimulus (IS). It has long been known that both the
duration of FP and its intertrial variability have marked effects on
reaction time (RT; e.g., Woodrow, 1914; Wundt, 1887; see Niemi
& Naatanen, 1981, for a review). These effects are commonly
attributed to the participant's state of nonspecific preparation—
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nonspecific because WS provides no information about the content
of IS or the response required to IS, but merely about its moment
of presentation. According to the strategic view, the state of
nonspecific preparation reflects an intentionally driven preparatory
process that is guided by expectancies about the moment of IS
presentation. By contrast, according to the conditioning view re-
cently put forward by Los, Knol, and Boers (2001; see also Los,
1996), the state of nonspecific preparation corresponds to a con-
ditioned response unintentionally elicited by WS. In this article,
we show that the conditioning view accounts for several effects of
FP at least as well as the strategic view. In addition, we provide
empirical support for the conditioning view by dissociating inten-
tional and unintentional contributions to the state of nonspecific
preparation.
Basic Design and Phenomena
The starting point of our discussion is a set of well-established
phenomena that can be observed in variations on a basic design.
To understand this design, suppose that four levels of FP
(e.g., 0.5,1.0, 1.5, and 2.0 s) are presented in both pure and mixed
blocks of trials. When presented in a pure block, only one level of
FP occurs across the trials of a block, and so four pure blocks are
required to present the four different levels of FP. When presented
in a mixed block, all levels of FP occur (randomly) across the trials
of a block. For the moment, we consider only a uniform distribu-
tion of FPs in mixed blocks (i.e., when each level of FP has an
equal probability of occurrence on each trial); we return to other
distributions of FP in the General Discussion section. Furthermore,
we introduce the concepts critical moment and imperative moment
(cf. Los et al., 2001). A critical moment is a possible time of IS
presentation relative to WS in a given block of trials. The imper-
ative moment is the actual time of IS presentation on a given trial.
Thus, in our example, a mixed block has four critical moments
at 0.5, 1.0, 1.5, and 2.0 s from WS, whereas, on any specific trial,
only one of these moments is imperative. In a pure block, only one
moment is critical, and it coincides with the imperative moment on
each trial.
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Two effects are invariably found in studies with this design.
First, the effect of FP on mean RT depends on block type. In pure
blocks, mean RT increases linearly with FP1 (e.g., Bertelson &
Tisseyre, 1968; Elliot, 1970; Holender & Bertelson, 1975; Simon
& Slaviero, 1975), whereas, in mixed blocks, mean RT is longest
for the shortest FP and decreases as a negatively accelerating
function of FP (Bertelson & Tisseyre, 1968; Elliot, 1970; Requin
& Granjon, 1969; Requin, Granjon, Dump, & Reynard, 1973).
Second, there are sequential effects in mixed blocks, such that the
effect of FP on a given trial depends on the duration of the FP that
occurred on the preceding trial. Specifically, longer RTs have been
reported for a given FP when it is preceded by a longer FP than
when it is preceded by an equally long or shorter FP (e.g.,
Baumeister & Joubert, 1969; Drazin, 1961; Possamai, Granjon,
Reynard, & Requin, 1975). That is, sequential effects of FP are
asymmetric in that long FPs prolong RT for subsequent shorter
FPs, whereas the converse is not true.
We emphasize that these two effects are not independent. Asym-
metric sequential effects in mixed blocks strongly, if not totally,
determine the effect of FP on mean RT. The longer an FP, the
lower the probability that an even longer FP occurred on the
preceding trial. Hence, as FP lengthens, responding is, on average,
less subject to the slowing influence of the preceding trial.
The Strategic View of Nonspecific Preparation
The strategic view of preparation goes back to the classical
experimental work by Woodrow (1914; see Niemi & Naatanen,
1981, for a review). The underlying assumption of this view is that
an optimal preparatory state is rapidly reached but can be main-
tained for only a brief period (e.g., Alegria, 1975; Gottsdanker,
1975; Naatanen, 1972). Thus, participants can bring about peaks of
preparation and respond more quickly as these peaks have more
temporal overlap with the imperative moment. The degree of
overlap is in turn affected by two factors, time uncertainty and
expectancy.
Time uncertainty refers to the participant's inability to estimate
perfectly the moment of presentation of an expected event. Klem-
mer (1957) showed that, in a synchronization task in which par-
ticipants were asked to synchronize their response with the onset
of IS, the variance in response latency increased as a function of
FP, indicating that a participant's time uncertainty increases as FP
increases. In the context of RT tasks, this increase in time uncer-
tainty is assumed to reduce the participant's preparatory state at the
imperative moment, which in turn prolongs RT (Gottsdanker,
1970; Klemmer, 1956, 1957; Naatanen & Merisalo, 1977; Niemi
& Naatanen, 1981). In pure blocks, time uncertainty is the only
factor that determines the variation in the preparatory state, which
explains the observed RT increase as a function of FP. In mixed
blocks, however, time uncertainty is considered to be dominated
by the expectancy of the participant as to which of several critical
moments is going to be imperative on a given trial. Initially, it was
assumed that expectancy strongly correlates with the objective
conditional probability of IS presentation, which is low at the start
of a trial and increases as time goes by without IS presentation.
The corresponding growth of expectancy is assumed to enhance
the participant's preparatory state, which in turn speeds responding
(Baumeister & Joubert, 1969; Drazin, 1961; Niemi & Naatanen,
1981; Requin & Granjon, 1969; Stilitz, 1972). Thus, time uncer-
tainty along with expectancy in terms of the conditional probabil-
ity of IS presentation provides an adequate explanation for FP
effects on mean RT in both pure and mixed blocks, and conse-
quently these concepts have found general acceptance in the liter-
ature (e.g., Luce, 1986; Sperling & Dosher, 1986).
Unfortunately, the traditional concept of expectancy has the
fundamental problem that it is oblivious to sequential effects.
Therefore, alternative ways to conceive of expectancy proved
necessary. One proposal (Niemi & Naatanen, 1981; Requin,
Brener, & Ring, 1991) is that, at the start of a trial in a mixed
block, participants aim their preparation at the critical moment that
was imperative on the preceding trial (i.e., they expect an FP
repetition) and prepare again for a later critical moment if IS has
not occurred by that time. Consequently, when the imperative
moment occurs earlier than on the preceding trial, RT will be long,
whereas when the imperative moment occurs later than on the
preceding trial, a long RT may be prevented by means of reprepa-
ration for a later critical moment.
Although this proposal accounts for both sequential and mean
effects of FP, it has lost the parsimony of the initial concept of
expectancy in terms of the conditional probability of IS presenta-
tion. In particular, its assumption that participants use a strategy of
aiming their preparation at the critical moment that was imperative
on the preceding trial is suspect for at least two reasons. First, it
begs the question of why participants do not opt for the more
successful strategy of preparing on each trial for the first critical
moment and initiate the repreparation cycle from there. Second,
there is substantial evidence that even with two equiprobable
alternatives, people tend to expect an alternation rather than a
repetition of events, as illustrated by the gambler's fallacy (Jarvik,
1951; Soetens, 1998; Soetens, Boer, & Hueting, 1985; Wagenaar,
1972). Despite these problems, the intentional nature of nonspe-
cific preparation has never been seriously challenged.
The Conditioning View of Nonspecific Preparation
Los et al. (2001) highlighted the similarity between the FP
design under present examination and designs used to examine
trace conditioning in animals. Trace conditioning is a form of
classical or operant conditioning defined by a blank interstimulus
interval between a conditioned stimulus and an unconditioned
stimulus. It is well established that after some acquisition training,
a conditioned response develops that is time locked to the condi-
tioned stimulus and obtains its peak at or about the moment the
unconditioned stimulus is presented (e.g., Gallistel & Gibbon,
2000; Grossberg & Merrill, 1992; Machado, 1997; Roberts, 1998).
Los et al. argued that nonspecific preparation may rely on the same
principles as trace conditioning, because critical moments in the
FP design are time locked to WS.
This view relies on four assumptions (cf. Los, 1996; Los et al.,
in press). First, corresponding to each critical moment there is a
state of conditioning, the adjustment of which is governed by
1
 Obviously, this linearity holds only for intermediate FPs. On the one
hand, the linearity must break down somewhere for long FPs, when
ultimately an asymptotic RT value is reached reflecting a completely
unprepared state (e.g., Warrick, Kibler, Topmiller, & Bates, 1964; Wood-
row, 1914). On the other hand, the FP-RT function becomes U shaped
when FP is extended down to 0 s, when the lowest point is found for an FP
somewhere between 100 ms and 300 ms (Bertelson, 1967; Sperling &
Dosher, 1986).
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learning rules of trace conditioning (specified subsequently). The
state of conditioning implicates an increase and decay of response-
related activation as a critical moment is bypassed in time. This
conditioned response is preparatory in nature, because an increase
in response-related activation does not lead to an overt response as
long as the motor-action limit is not exceeded (cf. Naatanen, 1971;
Naatanen & Merisalo, 1977). Second, the conditioned response
takes more time to build up and decay and its asymptotic value is
lower when its corresponding critical moment is more remote from
the warning signal. Third, on any trial, the strength of the condi-
tioned response corresponding to a critical moment is reinforced
(i.e., increased toward its asymptote) if and only if that critical
moment coincides with the imperative moment. Fourth, and most
characteristic for the model, on any trial the strength of the
conditioned response is extinguished (i.e., driven away from its
asymptote) if and only if its corresponding critical moment occurs
before the imperative moment, whereas it is left unaffected if its
corresponding critical moment occurs later than the imperative
moment. The rationale underlying the latter assumption is that
quickly rising conditioned activation during FP should be sup-
pressed to prevent premature responding, whereas this need is
cancelled by the event of IS presentation.
When it is furthermore assumed that RT is inversely related to
the strength of the conditioned response at the imperative moment,
a model based on the preceding four assumptions readily accounts
for the effects of FP in pure and mixed blocks. This is illustrated
in Figure 1. In pure blocks, there is only one critical moment, for
which the corresponding strength of the conditioned response
approaches its asymptote after some trials as a result of repeated
reinforcement (Assumption 3). Because the asymptote is lower as
a critical moment is more remote from WS (Assumption 2; Figure
1 A), there is a decrease in the preparatory state and a correspond-
ing increase in RT as FP lengthens. In mixed blocks, the rules for
reinforcement and extinction constitute a different picture. Sup-
pose that at the start of trial n, there is an equal state of condition-
ing corresponding to each critical moment (Figure IB). Now
suppose that, on trial n, the earliest critical moment of 0.5 s is
imperative. Then, after trial n, the state of conditioning corre-
sponding to this critical moment is increased as a result of rein-
forcement (Assumption 3), whereas the state of conditioning cor-
responding to the other critical moments is left unchanged because
they were not bypassed during FP (Assumption 4; Figure 1C).
Now, suppose that on trial n + 1 the latest critical moment of 2.0 s
is imperative. Then, after trial n + I, the state of conditioning
corresponding to this critical moment is increased, whereas the
state of conditioning corresponding to the other critical moments is
decreased because they were bypassed during FP (Assumption 4;
Figure ID). Across the trials of a mixed block, these dynamics
culminate in an average state of conditioning, depicted in Figure
IE. The state of conditioning corresponding to the earliest critical
moment is lowest, because it receives extinction on 75% of the
trials (i.e., whenever another critical moment is imperative). It is
progressively higher for subsequent critical moments, which are
increasingly less bypassed during FP in the course of a block (i.e.,
on 50%, 25%, and 0% of the trials for FPs of 1.0, 1.5, and 2.0 s,
respectively).
We emphasize that the state of conditioning depicted in Figure
IE is merely an average that is not necessarily representative of
any single tria/. Especially the state of conditioning corresponding
to early critical moments may vary strongly from trial to trial,
Pure blocks
c
o
••§
>
Ac
t
c
g
>
Ac
t
g
>
••s
<
- y
0.0
B
0.0
A
/ \ // \/
'X
0.5
A ,
/)<
0.5
t
imperative
C
y
A/ \/ V1X
average across trials
v v~^A\
1.0 1.5 2.0
Mixed blocks
1.0 1.5 2.0
stimulus
X X
V
2.5 3.0
trial n
V
2.5 3.0
rial n+1
\V
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2,0 2.5 3.0
imperative stimulus
o
5
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
O
>
<
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
Time (s)
Figure 1. Theoretical states of conditioned activation corresponding to
the critical moments in pure and mixed blocks according to the condition-
ing view of preparation. A: In pure blocks, the conditioned activation has
a lower peak and is more smeared over the time scale as its corresponding
critical moment is more remote from the warning signal. B-D: Adjustment
of the conditioned activation across three subsequent trials in mixed blocks.
For the critical moment that coincides with the imperative moment (i.e., the
moment used for the presentation of the imperative stimulus), the corre-
sponding state of conditioning is reinforced (Panels B-D). For critical
moments that occur later than the imperative moment, the corresponding
state of conditioning is left unchanged (Panels B and C). For critical
moments that occur earlier than the imperative moment, the corresponding
states of conditioning are subject to extinction (Panels C and D). E: The
state of conditioning in mixed blocks when averaged across trials.
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depending on the duration of the preceding FP. Indeed, dynamic
adjustments of conditioned activation are at the core of the con-
ditioning view. These adjustments account directly for the occur-
rence of asymmetric sequential effects and only indirectly for
effects on mean RT. Thus, the conditioning view meets the objec-
tive that a good explanation for FP effects on RT should, first and
foremost, account for sequential effects.
The Nature of Nonspecific Preparation
At the start of this article, we rather loosely distinguished the
strategic view and the conditioning view on the basis of the role of
intention. In this section, we make this distinction more precise.
The critical sense in which we think nonspecific preparation is
intentional according to the strategic view but unintentional ac-
cording to the conditioning view is with respect to the within-trial
development of preparation at critical moments. Within the bounds
of the strategic view, several researchers have argued in favor of
the strategic nature of this preparation (e.g., Alegria, 1975; Gotts-
danker, 1975; Naatanen, 1971), as vividly expressed by Gotts-
danker (1975):
Let us consider an imaginary RT experiment on an astute S [subject].
After giving him a series of trials using a warning interval between 1
and 3 s, we omit the warning signal on one trial. His RT on that trial
is 300 ms whereas his average had been 150 ms. We ask him why he
was so slow. "/ was not prepared." We then ask whether he does
something to become prepared. "Of course, I start paying attention
and get ready to move my finger." We question further whether it
takes much time to become prepared. "Oh, it is like doing anything
else—something like tightening my grip on the steering wheel when I
suddenly see a bump ahead." Finally, we ask why he didn't simply
stay prepared between trials. "Are you serious? It takes real effort.
You just can't be 'up' all the time." (pp. 33-34)
The mechanism this view seems to endorse is that a critical
moment is selected on the basis of high subjective expectancy and
made the focus of intentional, even effortful, preparatory activity
(e.g., Niemi & Naatanen, 1981). This mechanism is also clear from
the notion of "repreparation," which, as explained earlier, fulfills a
key role in the strategic view. Indeed, repreparation implies that as
soon as participants notice that the imperative moment occurs later
than the critical moment for which they initially prepared, they
may use the remaining part of FP to reprepare for a later critical
moment (Alegria, 1974; Loveless & Sanford, 1974).
In contrast, the conditioning view claims that within-trial prep-
aration at the critical moments develops unintentionally, elicited
by the occurrence of WS, which serves as the conditioned stimu-
lus. The difference between this view and the strategic view is
perhaps best appreciated by comparing the effortful preparatory
activity reported by Gottsdanker's (1975) "astute subject" with the
conditioned salivation response of Pavlov's (1927) dog. In fact,
there is good empirical evidence that the conditioned response is
elicited in spite of contrary intentions of the participant (Dawson &
Reardon, 1969).
We emphasize, however, that the conditioning view does not
imply that all processing within its bounds is devoid of intention.
To make sure that this point is well taken, we now point out several
senses in which the conditioning view does not exclude intentional
contributions. First, the conditioning view does not imply that the
adjustment of the state of conditioning is independent of the
intentions of the participant. In fact, recent experimental findings
at our laboratory suggest that this adjustment critically depends on
the general intention of the participant to respond as quickly as
possible to IS. Specifically, we found sequential effects to be much
reduced after a trial on which the participant was instructed, before
WS, not to respond to IS. Thus, when the participant has no
intention to respond to IS, the state of conditioning corresponding
to an early critical moment is much less suppressed when bypassed
during FP than when the participant intends to respond to IS. This
suggests that a general intention to respond is crucial to switch on
the conditioning mechanism described in the previous section.
Second, our claim that response-related activation builds up
unintentionally at critical moments should not be taken to imply
that it also proceeds "automatically" in the sense that participants
have no conscious awareness of the different critical moments in
the design (cf. Dawson & Schell, 1985; Posner & Snyder, 1975).
In fact, it is exceedingly difficult to demonstrate conditioning
without participants being aware of the contingency between the
conditioned and the unconditioned stimulus (see Dawson & Schell,
1985, for a comprehensive review and Ohman & Soares, 1998, for
recent empirical work). Similarly, it may well be that both the
acquisition and the production of the conditioned response de-
scribed here require participants to be aware of the different
critical moments in the design.
Third, and most important for present purposes, the conditioning
view does not imply that intentional preparation cannot contribute
to the state of nonspecific preparation. In fact, it seems quite likely
that intentional preparation may enhance the preparatory state at a
critical moment over and above the preparatory state deriving from
conditioning alone. The conditioning view does imply, though,
that a contribution of intentional preparation is not necessary for
the observation of the typical (sequential) effects of FP.
As it turns out, then, the difference between the conditioning
view and the strategic view concerning the role of intention is
limited to the within-trial development of the state of preparation.
Nevertheless, we think that this difference is theoretically impor-
tant in that it underlies different preparatory mechanisms, as out-
lined in the previous sections.
Experimental Approach
To contrast the two major accounts of FP effects, we aimed at
dissociating unintentional and intentional contributions to the state
of nonspecific preparation. We modeled our experimental ap-
proach after the one used by Marcel and Forrin (1974) to examine
the nature of the category-repetition effect. They had participants
identify letters and digits that were randomly presented across the
trials of each block. They observed the category-repetition effect,
in which RTs were shorter for category repetitions (i.e., for a letter
when preceded by a letter or for a digit when preceded by a digit)
than for category alternations (i.e., for a letter preceded by a digit,
or vice versa). In another experiment, Marcel and Forrin (1974,
Experiment 3) presented a cue at the start of each trial informing
the participant whether the impending category would be a letter or
a digit. The cue was mostly valid but sometimes invalid, in which
case it specified a digit before the actual presentation of a letter, or
vice versa. Marcel and Forrin observed that whereas the category-
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repetition effect was almost absent on valid-cue trials, it was as
strong on invalid-cue trials as on neutral-cue control trials.
These results suggest that the category-repetition effect, as ob-
served on neutral-cue trials, does not result from an intentional
preparatory strategy. The reason is as follows. The reduction of the
category-repetition effect on valid-cue trials indicates that a par-
ticipant is capable of intentionally enhancing his or her preparatory
state for a specific category. However, if this intentional prepara-
tion also underlies the category-repetition effect, this effect should
be eliminated not only on valid-cue trials but also on invalid-cue
trials. The reason is that, if preparation is directed to the incorrect
category, responding should be slow regardless of whether the
category is the same as on the preceding trial or not. Therefore, as
Marcel and Forrin (1974) concluded, observation of a pronounced
category-repetition effect on invalid-cue trials indicates that this
effect is unintentional in nature and reflects residual activation
carried over from the preceding trial.
Following the approach of Marcel and Forrin (1974), we used
two major variables: sequential order of FPs in mixed blocks and
information about the duration of the impending FP, provided by
a cue at the start of each trial. Across experiments, the cue was
either neutral, when it provided no information about the duration
of the impending FP, or informative. An informative cue was
either valid, when it correctly specified the duration of the im-
pending FP, or invalid, when it specified another FP than the one
used on that trial. The task we asked our participants to perform
was a choice-reaction task involving two compatible IS-response
pairs and not a simple-reaction task involving a single IS-response
pair, as is more customary in research on nonspecific preparation
(e.g., Niemi & Naatanen, 1981). A choice-reaction task has per-
haps the disadvantage of introducing uncertainty about the content
of IS in addition to uncertainty about its timing, thereby detracting
attention from the purpose of the study. On the other hand, in view
of its accuracy requirements, a choice-reaction task discourages
undesirable anticipatory response behavior more thoroughly than a
simple-reaction task, even when catch trials (i.e., trials on which
no IS occurs and the participant is required to withhold the re-
sponse) are included. In any case, this issue is probably of minor
importance given that many studies indicate that the effects of FP
are at least qualitatively similar across the two types of tasks.2
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 was designed to replicate and extend previous
findings. We presented FP in both pure and mixed blocks. In half
of these blocks we presented the neutral cue, and in the other half
we presented the valid cue. We also manipulated financial reward
for fast and accurate responding to examine to what extent inten-
tional preparation depends on the motivational state of the partic-
ipant. Our predictions were as follows. First, in the neutral-cue
condition, we expected to replicate the classical effects of FP on
RT: the differential effect of FP in pure and mixed blocks and
asymmetric sequential effects of FP in mixed blocks. Second, in
the valid-cue condition, we expected a reduction of these effects
consistent with the findings of a few studies in which preknowl-
edge about the impending FP was varied (Kingstone, 1992, Ex-
periment 4; Mo & Kersey, 1980; Zahn, 1970). Third, reasoning
that this reduction depends on the motivation of the participant to
prepare on the basis of the cue, we expected it to be stronger when
fast and accurate responding was rewarded than when it was not
rewarded.
We emphasize that the findings Experiment 1 sought to replicate
are not yet diagnostic about the nature of nonspecific preparation.
In particular, the expected outcome that participants are capable of
preparing on the basis of a valid cue is not inconsistent with the
conditioning view. It should be kept in mind that even though this
view assumes that effects of FP derive first and foremost from an
unintentional preparatory process, it does not exclude the possi-
bility that an intentional preparatory process can contribute to
these effects, as outlined in the previous section.
Method
Participants. Ten students between 19 and 23 years of age, all with
normal or corrected-to-normal vision, volunteered as participants. They
were paid 25 Dutch guilders (about $12) along with an additional bonus
depending on their task performance.
Materials. The experiment was conducted on a computer equipped
with a 486 DX2/66 processor and a 38.1-cm video graphics array color
monitor. The software package ERTS was used for the layout and timing
of the experimental trials (Beringer, 1992). The EXKEY interface con-
nected the computer to an external response panel and allowed RT to be
measured to the nearest millisecond. The response panel consisted of a
23-cm X 38-cm 10° tilted surface on which two microswitches were
mounted, 3.5 cm from the upper side of the panel and 21.0 cm from each
other. Each microswitch was covered by a round response button 2.5 cm in
diameter. Participants sat at a distance of about 50 cm from the computer
screen, with their left and right index fingers resting on the left and right
response buttons, respectively. They wore padded headphones (Sennheis-
ser, HD 250) through which the auditory WS was presented.
All visual stimuli were presented on the dark computer screen. The cue
was a 1.5-cm X 1.0-cm vertical bar divided in three piled boxes 1.0 cm
wide and 0.5 cm high. The contours of each box were yellow 0.1-cm line
segments. In the neutral-cue condition, the boxes were uncolored and
showed the dark computer screen. In the valid-cue condition, the boxes
were colored yellow in accordance with the duration of one of three FPs.
A coloring of only the bottom box indicated an impending FP of 0.5 s. An
additional coloring of each subsequent box indicated impending FPs of 1.0
and 1.5 s, respectively. A cross, consisting of two yellow crossed
bars 1.0 X 0.5 cm in size, served as a fixation stimulus. The IS was a
downward pointing white arrow 2.0 cm long that consisted of a 1.5-
cm X 1.0-cm bar attached to a 0.5-cm arrowhead with a maximum width
of 2.0 cm.
Task. A trial started with the presentation of a valid or neutral cue on
the middle of the screen. After 1,000 ms, the cue was replaced by the
fixation stimulus. At the same time WS, a 1500 Hz pure tone, was
presented for 50 ms over the headphones. The offset of WS marked the
start of FP. When FP had expired, the fixation stimulus disappeared, and IS
appeared with equal probability 4.5 cm to either the left or the right of the
middle of the screen. Participants responded by making a spatially com-
patible button press. IS disappeared immediately after the response or after
the expiration of a maximum interval of 1,500 ms, whichever occurred
2
 Eric Soetens suggested that, in a choice-reaction task, effects of FP
may (partly) reflect differential sequential effects of IS-response pairs at
different critical moments. Van den Heuvel (2000) examined this possi-
bility in a data set very similar to the one reported in this study and
observed a slightly shorter RT for intertrial alternations of IS-response
pairs than for intertrial repetitions (consistent with findings of Soetens et
al., 1985). Importantly, this effect was additive to the (sequential) effect of
FP. For this reason, we collapsed our data across (intertrial transitions of)
IS-response pairs in all of the experiments reported in this article.
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earlier. After a blank interval of 100 ms, feedback appeared on the screen
for 400 ms. During practice and in the no-payoff condition, feedback
concerned accuracy only. In the case of a correct response the Dutch word
goed (good) appeared in green, whereas in the case of an incorrect response
the word fout (wrong) appeared in red. In the payoff condition, two
additional feedback categories were used: te snel (too fast) and te traag
(too slow) in red, when correct responses were below 100 ms and above an
upper criterion (described subsequently), respectively. A blank interval of
400 ms separated subsequent trials.
Design and procedure. The independent variables were all varied
within participants, and included FP (0.5,1.0, or 1.5 s), block type (pure or
mixed), cue type (neutral or valid), and reward (payoff or no payoff). In
pure blocks only one FP was used across trials, whereas in mixed blocks
the three possible FPs were randomly and equiprobably presented across
trials. Cue type was varied between blocks, and reward was varied between
two separate sessions. RT and percentage of errors (PE) were the depen-
dent variables.
Participants were tested individually for about 3 hr. They were instructed
to respond as quickly as possible while maintaining high accuracy. It was
emphasized that the cue, whenever informative, always provided valid
information. Furthermore, preceding each block of trials, participants read
a text on the screen informing them of the impending cue type (neutral or
valid), block type (pure or mixed), and, in the case of a pure block, FP
duration. Participants initiated a block by pressing one of the response
buttons.
Participants practiced six 12-trial pure blocks (two blocks with each FP)
and two 14-trial mixed blocks, first with neutral cues and then with valid
cues. They received visual feedback on mean RT and mean PE after each
block. After the last practice block, there were two experimental sessions,
one with payoff and one without payoff, the order of which was counter-
balanced across participants. In the payoff session, the participant's median
RT over the final 85 trials of the practice session served as an individual
criterion. Participants started with 5.40 Dutch guilders. They lost 1 cent in
the case of a correct response above the criterion and lost 2 cents in the case
of an incorrect response or a correct response below 100 ms; otherwise,
they earned 1 cent.
Either session consisted of 16 blocks of 62 trials each; 10 blocks were
mixed and 6 blocks were pure, 2 with each FP. In either session, half of the
pure and mixed blocks contained informative cues, and the other half
contained uninformative cues. The order of blocks within a session was
randomized for each participant. A brief interval was inserted between
subsequent blocks during which participants received visual feedback on
mean RT and mean PE, and, in the payoff session, on their cumulative
financial reward. After each series of 8 experimental blocks, a 5-min break
was inserted.
Data analysis. The data of the practice session were discarded, as were
the first two trials of each block and trials on which the RT was either
below 100 ms or above 1,000 ms. Mean RTs, computed over correct trials,
and mean PEs were subjected to separate univariate analyses of variance
(ANOVA) with repeated measures. The Huyn-Feldt correction was ap-
plied in all tests involving variables with more than two levels to correct for
possible violations of the sphericity of the variance-covariance matrix
(e.g., Stevens, 1992). An alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical tests.
Results
Pure versus mixed blocks. Figure 2 shows mean RT as a
function of FP, block type, cue type, and reward. An ANOVA on
these data yielded longer RTs in the session without payoff (253
ms) than in the session with payoff (230 ms), F(l, 9) = 56.94,
MSE = 569.67, p < .001, and longer RTs in mixed blocks (244
ms) than in pure blocks (238 ms), F(l, 9) = 21.56, MSE = 112.23,
p < .01. The main effects of cue type, F(l, 9) = 3.59, MSE =
123.46, p > .05, and FP, F < 1, were nonsignificant. There were
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Figure 2. Mean reaction times in Experiment 1 as a function of forepe-
riod, block type, cue type, and financial reward. Panels A and B show the
data for the no payoff and payoff conditions, respectively.
four significant two-way interactions. First, the interaction be-
tween block type and FP, F(2, 18) = 23.93, MSE = 110.19, p <
.001, replicated the classical effect that RT increases with FP in
pure blocks and decreases with RT in mixed blocks. Second, the
interaction between block type and cue type, F(l, 9) = 12.40,
MSE = 58.71, p < .01, reflects the fact that valid cues reduced RT
in mixed blocks but not in pure blocks. Third, the interaction
between reward and block type, F( 1,9) = 6.78,M5£= 84.13, p<
.05, indicates that payoff was more effective in mixed blocks than
in pure blocks. This differential effect of reward was limited to the
shortest FP, as indicated by a significant three-way interaction
among reward, block type, and FP, F(2,18) = 5.04, MSE = 39.31,
p < .05. Fourth, the interaction between FP and cue type, F(2,
18) = 9.00, MSE = 73.46, p < .01, indicates that the benefit of an
informative cue decreased as FP increased. This interaction was
clearly present in mixed blocks but not in pure blocks, as indicated
by the significant interaction among block type, cue type, and FP,
F(2, 18) = 6.04, MSE = 64.24, p < .05. There were no significant
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effects involving both reward and cue type, indicating that a valid
cue flattened the FP-RT function in mixed blocks irrespective of
reward. Despite this flattening, a small RT difference between pure
and mixed blocks remained for the shortest FP in the valid-cue
condition.
Overall PE averaged 1.37%. Table 1 shows mean PE as a
function of FP, block type, cue type, and reward. An ANOVA on
these data yielded no significant main effects. There was a signif-
icant interaction between block type and FP, F(2, 18) = 7.15,
MSE = 2.98, p < .01, indicating that PE decreased with FP in pure
blocks (2.34%, 1.04%, and 0.83% for FPs of 0.5, 1.0, and 1.5 s,
respectively) but remained roughly the same across FP in mixed
blocks (1.08%, 1.45%, and 1.45% for FPs of 0.5, 1.0, and 1.5 s,
respectively). Thus, the reported increase of RT with FP in pure
blocks seems, at least to some extent, due to shifts in the speed-
accuracy trade-off. Finally, there was a significant interaction
among reward, block type, cue type, and FP, F(2, 18) = 3.75,
MSE = 18.08, p < .05; we do not attempt to interpret this
interaction because the data did not show a consistent pattern.
Sequential effects. Figure 3 shows mean RT in mixed blocks
as a function of FP,, (where n denotes the trial from which RT is
sampled), FPn_,, cue type, and reward. An ANOVA performed on
these data revealed shorter RTs in the session with payoff (231 ms)
than in the session without payoff (258 ms), F(l, 9) = 43.44,
MSE = 1431.11, p < .001, and shorter RTs for valid cues (241 ms)
than for neutral cues (248 ms), F(l, 9) = 15.10, MSE = 256.58,
p < .01. Furthermore, RT decreased with FPn, F(2, 18) = 9.11,
MSE = 314.30, p < .01 (mean RTs were 250, 242, and 241 ms for
FPns of 0.5, 1.0, and 1.5 s, respectively) and increased with FPn_!,
F(2, 18) = 33.05, MSE = 160.28, p < .001 (mean RTs were 238,
244, and 251 ms forFPn_,s of 0.5, 1.0, and 1.5 s, respectively). A
significant interaction between FPn and FPn_1; F(4, 36) = 15.01,
MSE = 80.05, p < .001, indicates that the effect of FPn_j
decreased as FP,, increased. As Figure 3 shows, the effect of FPn_[
was very strong when FPn was 0.5 s and virtually absent when FP,,
was either 1.0 or 1.5 s. Cue type interacted both with FPn, F(2,
18) = 53.06, MSE = 58.77, p < .001, and with FPn_,, F(2,
18) = 13.95, MSE = 4436, p < .001. In turn, these variables were
involved in a significant three-way interaction, F(4, 36) = 16.00,
MSE = 46.49, p < .001. As Figure 3 shows, the presentation of a
valid cue strongly reduced the sequential effect for the shortest FPB
Table 1
Error Percentages in Experiment 1 as a Function of Foreperiod
(in Seconds), Block Type, Cue Type, and Reward
Pure block Mixed block
Foreperiod Neutral cue Valid cue Neutral cue Valid cue
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.17
0.67
0.83
No payoff
2.51
0.83
1.00
1.50
1.70
0.91
1.31
1.20
1.81
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.18
2.00
0.83
Payoff
2.51
0.67
0.68
0.20
1.30
1.80
1.30
1.61
1.30
but not for the longer FPns. In spite of this reduction, the effect of
FPn_! for the shortest FP,, in the valid-cue condition (averaged
across the levels of reward) was still significant, F(2, 18) = 6.34,
MSE = 82.17, p < .01. Finally, the interaction between reward and
FPn_; approached significance, F(2, 18) = 3.47, MSE = 74.35,
p = .053, indicating that the effect of the preceding FP tended to
be somewhat less pronounced in the payoff condition than in the
condition without payoff.
Table 2 shows mean PE in mixed blocks as a function of FPn,
FP,,.!, cue type, and reward. An ANOVA on these data was not
possible, because there was no variance in one condition in which
all participants had faultless performance. Therefore, we merely
note that, across conditions, mean PE was 1.35%, and the range
was 0% to 3.35% among conditions.
Discussion
Experiment 1 replicated classical effects of FP in pure and
mixed blocks (e.g., Niemi & Naatanen, 1981; Woodrow, 1914). In
the neutral-cue condition, RT increased with FP in pure blocks and
decreased with FP in mixed blocks. This difference derived, at
least to a large extent, from sequential effects in mixed blocks,
where RT was longer for a given FP when it was preceded by a
longer FP than when it was preceded by an equally long or shorter
FP.3 In regard to the shortest FP, Experiment 1 also replicated
earlier findings concerning the role of preknowledge (Kingstone,
1992; Mo & Kersey, 1980; Zahn, 1970). For this FP, participants
proved capable of reducing RT in mixed blocks relative to that in
pure blocks when the trial started with a valid cue. In turn, this
reduction was, to a large extent, due to a near elimination of
sequential effects in mixed blocks.
Payoff proved to be an excellent motivator in that it consider-
ably enhanced performance in general. On the assumption that the
extent of preparation on the basis of a valid cue depends on the
motivational state of the participant (e.g., De Jong, 2000), we
expected a greater effect of cue type in the payoff condition than
in the condition without payoff. However, the relevant interaction
between cue type and reward was far from significant. Inspection
of the data corresponding to the shortest FP (i.e., Figure 3A)
suggests a clear reason for this result. Participants made excellent
use of the valid cue, even without monetary incentive, as is
apparent from the near elimination of sequential effects in the
no-payoff, valid-cue condition. Therefore, in the payoff condition,
there was not much room for further enhancement of the state of
preparation at the imperative moment.
In conclusion, the results of Experiment 1 show that participants
are capable of intentional preparation for a specific imperative
moment, even in a state of less than optimal motivation. This result
is consistent with the strategic view of preparation, although it is
not inconsistent with the conditioning view, as explained in the
Experimental Approach section.
3
 Whether sequential effects can account for all of the systematic vari-
ance in RT caused by block type is difficult to assess, because it requires
higher order sequential effects in mixed blocks to be taken into account
(e.g., Drazin, 1961; Los et al., in press), along with differences between
pure and mixed blocks regarding the speed—accuracy trade-off (e.g., Ber-
telson, 1967; Los et al., in press).
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Finally, two findings of Experiment 1 pose problems for both
the strategic view and the conditioning view. First, RT for the
shortest FP was longer when the longest FP occurred on the
preceding trial than when the middle FP occurred on the preceding
trial. This effect is not in accordance with the strategic view,
because in both conditions participants are supposed to prepare for
a critical moment beyond the earliest critical moment, such that
repreparation is to no avail when the earliest critical moment
becomes imperative. This effect is also inconsistent with the con-
ditioning view, because the model we described has no proviso
that extinction of the state of conditioning corresponding to a
critical moment depends on the extent to which that critical mo-
ment is bypassed during FP on the preceding trial. Second, the
effects of block type and sequential effects in mixed blocks were
pronounced for the shortest FP but were hardly present for longer
FPs. Both the strategic view and the conditioning view predicted
this result for the longest FP but not for the middle FP. According
to the strategic view, after a trial with the longest FP, participants
are caught in a low preparatory state when the middle critical
moment becomes imperative, and repreparation is to no avail.
According to the conditioning view, the state of conditioning
corresponding to the middle critical moment is extinguished when
the longest FP was used on the preceding trial, also leading to a
low preparatory state. Both of these findings suggest that contri-
butions to the state of nonspecific preparation corresponding to a
critical moment, whether deriving from intentional preparation or
conditioning, are not as discrete as assumed so far but smeared
over time. We elaborate on this view in the General Discussion
section.
For the moment, the second finding makes it clear that the effect
of cue type can be meaningfully studied only for the shortest FP.
Indeed, if the state of nonspecific preparation is not affected by the
preceding FP, it makes no sense to explore a possible modifying
influence of cue type. Therefore, in the following experiments, we
limit the discussion of cue type to the shortest FP (see also
Kingstone, 1992, Experiment 4; Mo & Kersey, 1980; Zahn, 1970).
Experiment 2
Experiment 1 showed that participants are capable of intentional
preparation for a specific imperative moment when they have
preknowledge about the impending FP in mixed blocks. However,
this result is not conclusive about the nature of the nonspecific
preparation underlying the effect of FP. On the one hand, it is
possible that the same intentional preparatory process underlies the
effect of both cue type and FP, as follows from the strategic view.
On the other hand, it is possible that the contribution of an
intentional preparatory process to the state of nonspecific prepa-
ration obscures the contribution of an unintentional preparatory
process, as follows from the conditioning view.
Experiment 2 was aimed at unraveling intentional and uninten-
tional contributions to the state of nonspecific preparation. We
presented FPs in mixed blocks only, with valid cues occurring on
80% of the trials and invalid cues occurring on the remaining trials.
Because the cue was generally valid, we expected participants to
direct their preparation to the specified critical moment. Therefore,
we predicted only minimal sequential effects in the valid-cue
condition, consistent with the findings of Experiment 1. The stra-
tegic view and the conditioning view share this prediction but
make different predictions about performance in the invalid-cue
condition. The strategic view predicts that when IS occurs earlier
than specified by the cue (such that repreparation is not possible),
there should be only a general cost on RT and no sequential effects
exceeding those observed in the valid-cue condition. This is be-
cause the distraction of intentional preparation to a critical moment
beyond the imperative moment should cause the basis of sequen-
tial effects to disappear. By contrast, the conditioning view pre-
dicts that the cost inflicted by the invalid cue depends on the FP
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Table 2
Error Percentages in Mixed Blocks of Experiments 1, 2, and 3 as a Function of FPn, FPn_, (Both in Seconds), and Cue Type
Cue type
Neutral
No payoff
Payoff
Valid
No payoff
Payoff
Valid
Invalid
Neutral
Valid
Invalid
0.5-0.5
0.55
0.00
0.82
1.18
1.86
1.85
1.70
2.86
2.39
0.5-1.0
1.54
0.28
0.98
0.92
2.60
1.47
3.42
2.79
2.34
0.5-1.5
2.54
0.40
2.39
1.58
1.93
2.14
4.99
2.32
2.36
1.0-0.5
Experiment
1.34
1.59
0.89
2.99
Experiment
2.68
2.20
Experiment
2.00
2.25
2.36
F P . - F P -
1.0-1.0
1
1.14
1.01
1.23
0.57
2
2.54
2.08
3
2.02
2.32
2.56
1.0-1.5
2.79
1.37
1.25
1.44
1.74
2.31
2.53
1.90
1.65
1.5-0.5
0.90
3.35
2.07
0.61
2.08
3.03
2.55
2.31
3.33
1.5-1.0
0.27
0.62
2.63
1.80
2.84
2.80
3.31
2.47
2.96
1.5-1.5
1.13
1.49
0.97
1.91
2.52
3.19
1.41
2.04
2.59
Note. Reward was varied in Experiment 1 and fixed (payoff only) in Experiments 2 and 3. FP = foreperiod; n = trial from which reaction time is sampled.
occurring on the preceding trial because the distraction of inten-
tional preparation from the imperative moment should reveal the
state of conditioning corresponding to that moment in its uncon-
taminated form.
Method
Twenty-one students between 18 and 23 years of age, with normal or
corrected-to-normal vision, participated. None of them had participated in
Experiment 1. They were paid 25 Dutch guilders along with an additional
bonus depending on their performance. The apparatus, stimuli, and FPs, as
well as the order of events on a trial, were identical to those of Experi-
ment 1. FPs were presented in mixed blocks only, with an informative cue
occurring at the start of each trial. The cue provided valid information
about the duration of the impending FP on a random 80% of the trials. On
the remaining 20% of the trials, the cue provided invalid information and
specified with an equal probability the presentation of one of the two other
possible FPs. Participants were informed that the cue was usually but not
always valid. It was stressed, however, that regardless of cue validity, they
should try to respond as fast and as accurately as possible. Participants
received a single practice block of 68 trials during which the cue always
conveyed valid information, and feedback was given on accuracy only.
Then they completed, in a single experimental session, 15 mixed blocks of
122 trials each, with 5-min breaks following each series of 5 blocks.
Median RT over the final 60 trials of the practice block served as an
individual criterion in the payoff system used in the experimental session.
Participants started with 3.00 Dutch guilders. They lost 0.25 cents in the
case of a correct response that was slower than the criterion and lost 0.50
cents in the case of an incorrect response or a response below 100 ms;
otherwise, they earned 0.25 cents. In all other respects, the method was
identical to that of Experiment 1.
Results
Figure 4 shows RT as a function of cue validity (valid or
invalid), FPn (0.5, 1.0, or 1.5 s), and FPn_! (0.5, 1.0, or 1.5 s). An
ANOVA performed on these data revealed significant effects of
FP,,, F(2, 40) = 40.32, MSE = 221.40,/> < .001, and FPn_!, F(2,
40) = 49.00, MSE = 106.15, p < .001, as well as an interaction
between FPn and FPB_,, F(4, 80) = 17.54, MSE = 83.44, p <
.001. These effects replicated those of Experiment 1. Furthermore,
there was a significant main effect of cue validity, F(l,
20) = 23.56, MSE = 121.44, p < .001, indicating that responding
was slightly faster when the cue provided valid information (243
ms) than when it provided invalid information (248 ms). There was
a significant interaction between cue validity and FPn, F(2,
40) = 44.16, MSE = 47.94, p < .001, indicating that the effect of
cue validity was present for the shortest FPn but not for the other
two FPns. The interaction between cue validity and FP,,^ was not
significant, F(2, 40) = 2.78, MSE = 29.17, p > .05. Finally, there
was a significant three-way interaction among cue validity, FPn,
and FPn__i, F(4, 80) = 4.42, MSE = 29.04, p < .01. Tests of the
specific interaction effects for the separate FPns revealed that there
was a significant two-way interaction between cue validity and
FPn_, for the shortest FPn, F(2, 40) = 9.64, MSE = 32.94, p <
.001, but not for the other two FPns (F < 1 in both cases). This
effect is also clear from Figure 4. As in Experiment 1, the specific
main effect of FPn_! for the shortest FPn in the valid-cue condition
was still highly significant, F(2, 40) = 17.85, MSE = 116.67, p <
.001.
Overall PE averaged 2.37%. Table 2 shows mean PE as a
function of cue validity, FP,,, and FPn_i. The ANOVA on these
data yielded a significant main effect of FP,,, F(2, 40) = 5.06,
MSE = 5.12, p < .05, indicating that PE increased with FPn
(1.98%, 2.26%, and 2.86% for FPns of 0.5 s, 1.0 s, and 1.5 s,
respectively). This suggests that some part of the corresponding
effect on RT may have been attributable to shifts in speed-
accuracy trade-off. No other effects on PE were significant.
In a final analysis we examined, for the shortest FPn (Figure
4A), whether there were effects on RT of the specific invalid cue
(specifying an FP of either 1.0 or 1.5 s). The ANOVA with cue
NATURE OF NONSPECIFIC PREPARATION 379
280
^ 270
— 260
0)
•^ 250
o
I 240
CO
230
0.5 1.0
FPtrial n-
1.5
280
270
to
V
E
o
ac
ti
260
250
240
230
0.5 1.0 1.5
n-1 (s)
280
 n
^ 270
— 260
<D
"^  250
I 240
cZ
230
0.5 1.0 1.5
n-1 (s)
Valid cue Invalid cue
Figure 4. Mean reaction times in Experiment 2 as a function of FPtrial „ (the FP occurring on the trial from
which reaction time was sampled), F P ^ , „_,, and cue validity. FP = foreperiod. Panels A, B, and C show the
data for FPtria, „ s of 0.5 s, 1.0 s, and 1.5 s, respectively.
type (1.0 s or 1.5 s) and FPn_, (0.5 s, 1.0 s, or 1.5 s) as variables
revealed a main effect of cue type, F(l, 20) = 4.46, MSE =
198.52, p < .05, indicating that responding was slightly faster
when the cue specified an FPn of 1.0 s (260 rns) than when it
specified an FPn of 1.5 s (265 ms). Cue type did not interact with
FPn_, ( F < 1).
Discussion
Experiment 2 replicated the classical interaction between FPK
and FPn_,, a result that was also observed in Experiment 1. This
interaction depended in turn on cue validity: Cue validity modified
the effect of FPre_, for the shortest FPn but not for the longer FPns.
For reasons indicated in the Discussion section of Experiment 1,
we limit our discussion to the findings for the shortest FP,, (see
Figure 4A).
Regarding the shortest FPW two findings are important. First,
RT was shorter in the valid-cue condition than in the invalid-cue
condition. This shows that participants aimed their focus of inten-
tional preparation to the critical moment specified by the cue.
Second, the effect of FPn_i was stronger in the invalid-cue con-
dition than in the valid-cue condition. We anticipated that this
finding would favor the conditioning view over the strategic view.
According to the strategic view, the strategy of preparing on the
basis of the cue replaces the strategy of preparing on the basis of
FPn_i (i.e., the strategy suggested by the strategic view in the
absence of an informative cue). Therefore, to the extent that
sequential effects occur at all, they should not be any larger in the
invalid-cue condition than in the valid-cue condition, contrary
to our finding. By contrast, according to the conditioning view,
focusing intentional preparation on an incorrect critical moment
inflicts a cost on RT only to the extent that the conditioned
activation corresponding to the imperative moment is low. Specif-
ically, this cost should be low in the case in which the imperative
moment was also imperative on the preceding trial and high in the
case in which it was bypassed on the preceding trial, consistent
with our finding.
It is important to note, though, that the predictions deriving from
the strategic view and the conditioning view are accurate only
insofar as participants consistently prepare on the basis of the cue
on every trial. To see this, suppose that participants prepare on the
basis of the cue on only, say half of the trials, but ignore the cue
and prepare for the critical moment that was imperative on the
preceding trial on the other half of the trials. In that case, the
strategic view would also predict an interaction between cue
validity and FPn_,. Unfortunately, the data of Experiment 2 sug-
gest that participants may have followed such a mixture strategy.
In particular, there was a considerable effect of FPn_, even in the
valid-cue condition. If participants always prepared on the basis of
the information provided by the cue, this effect should have been
absent or very small, as was the case in Experiment 1.
Experiment 3
The purpose of Experiment 3 was to provide a stronger test of
the nature of nonspecific preparation along the lines of Experi-
ment 2. For this purpose, we repeated the main conditions of
Experiment 2 with the following changes. First, the percentage of
trials on which the cue was invalid was lowered from 20% to 10%.
By making the cue more reliable, participants were encouraged to
base their preparatory strategy on the information provided by the
cue. Second, we included blocks in which the cue was neutral to
examine how sequential effects in this condition compared with
those in the valid-cue and invalid-cue conditions.
Consistent with Experiment 1, we expected that sequential ef-
fects for the shortest FP,, would be smaller in the valid-cue con-
dition than in the neutral-cue condition. Relative to the sequential
effects in these conditions, the sequential effects in the invalid-cue
condition should provide insight into the nature of nonspecific
preparation. According to the strategic view, sequential effects in
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the invalid-cue condition should be equal to those in the valid-cue
condition. As explained earlier, this is because an incorrect pre-
paratory focus also causes the basis for sequential effects to
disappear. By contrast, according to the conditioning view, se-
quential effects in the invalid-cue condition should be equal to
those in the neutral-cue condition. This is because intentional
preparation for a specific critical moment is presumed not to occur
in the neutral-cue condition, whereas it is distracted from the
imperative moment in the invalid-cue condition. In either case,
sequential effects should solely reflect the state of conditioning
corresponding to the imperative moment.
Method
Twelve students between 19 and 23 years of age, all with normal or
corrected-to-normal vision, participated. None of them had participated in
one of the previous experiments. They were paid 100 Dutch guilders along
with an additional bonus depending on their performance. The apparatus,
stimuli, and FPs, as well as the order of events on a trial, were identical to
those of Experiment 2. FPs were presented in mixed blocks, whereas
informative and neutral cues were varied between blocks. The informative
cue was valid on a random 90% of the trials and invalid on the remaining
10% of the trials. Participants came to the laboratory on 4 different days
within a period of 2 weeks and completed 56 experimental blocks of 122
trials each, 49 blocks with informative cues and 7 blocks with neutral cues.
On the 1st day, they initially received task instruction and two 54-trial
practice blocks, followed by 8 experimental blocks. On the other 3 days,
participants started with one 54-trial practice block and then completed 16
experimental blocks. In all sessions, each series of 8 blocks contained 1
block with neutral cues at a random position relative to 7 blocks with
informative cues. During practice on the 1st day, feedback was given on
both accuracy and speed, with a speed criterion of 500 ms. Median RT for
the second practice block served as an individual criterion in the payoff
system throughout the experimental sessions. Participants started with 2.50
Dutch guilders. They earned 0.50 cents for each correct response between
100 ms and the criterion. Otherwise, they neither earned nor lost money.
Participants received visual feedback on performance and their current
money reward after every second block, and there was a 5-min break after
every eighth block. In all other respects, the method was identical to that
of Experiment 2.
Results
Figure 5 shows RT as a function of cue type (neutral, valid, or
invalid), Wn (0.5, 1.0, or 1.5 s), and FPn_! (0.5, 1.0, or 1.5 s). An
ANOVA performed on these data revealed significant effects of
FPn, F(2, 22) = 28.49, MSE = 166.99, p < .001, and FPn_,, F(2,
22) = 73.33, MSE = 30.06, p < .001, as well as an interaction
between FPB and FPn_!, F(4, 44) = 24.85, MSE = 15.57, p <
.001, replicating the results of Experiments 1 and 2. Furthermore,
there was a main effect of cue type, F(2, 22) = 6.89, MSE -
132.16, p < .01, indicating that overall responding was slightly
faster when the cue was neutral (225 ms) or valid (223 ms) than
when the cue was invalid (229 ms). Cue type interacted signifi-
cantly with FPW F(4, 44) = 15.19, MSE = 83.64, p < .01,
indicating that its effect was much stronger for the shortest FPn
than for the other two FPns, consistent with the results of Exper-
iment 2. Cue type also interacted significantly with FPn_i, F(4,
44) = 6.36, MSE = 9.37, p < .001, indicating that its effect
increased with FPB_,. As in Experiment 2, there was a significant
three-way interaction among cue type, FPn, and FPn_1, F(8,
88) = 4.62, MSE = 20.31, p < .01. This interaction indicates that
cue type strongly modifies the effect of FPn_l for the shortest FPn
but not for the longer FPns.
To examine the data for the shortest FPn (Figure 5A) in greater
detail, we performed a separate ANOVA on these data with FPn_,
and cue type as variables. This analysis revealed significant effects
of FPn_j, F(2, 22) = 63.77, MSE = 33.27, p < .001, and cue type,
F(2, 22) = 12.44, MSE = 269.70, p < .01, as well as a significant
interaction between these variables, F(4, 44) = 6.78,
MSE = 27.04, p < .001. Tests for simple main effects of cue type
showed that relative to RT for the neutral cue (234 ms), RT for the
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valid cue (223 ms) was significantly shorter, F(l, 11) = 16.12,
MSE = 772.75, p < .01, whereas RT for the invalid cue (242 ms)
was significantly longer, F(l, 11) = 6.89, MSE = 1,137.87, p <
.05. The simple main effect of FP,,^ in the valid-cue condition
was also significant, F(2, 22) = 13.73, MSE = 10.74, p < .001,
consistent with the results of Experiments 1 and 2. Furthermore,
we tested the interaction between FPn_! and cue type for each pair
of cues. The interaction was significant whenever the valid cue
was part of the pair: valid versus neutral, F(2, 22) = 16.92,
MSE = 17.04, p < .001, and valid versus invalid, F(2, 22) = 7.81,
MSE = 28.26, p < .05. By contrast, the interaction was not
significant for the comparison between the neutral cue and the
invalid cue, F(2, 22) = 1.14, MSE = 35.82, p > .30.
Finally, we examined whether RT for the shortest FPB was
affected by the specific invalid cue (specifying an FP of either 1.0
or 1.5 s) relative to the neutral-cue condition. The ANOVA with
cue type (neutral, 1.0 s, or 1.5 s) and FPn_i (0.5 s, 1.0 s, or 1.5 s)
as variables yielded main effects of FPn_,, F(2, 22) = 39.02,
MSE = 86.64, p < .001, and cue type, F(2, 22) = 8.31, MSE =
193.40, p < .01, but no interaction between these variables, F(4,
44) = 1.35, MSE = 71.61, p > .25. Tests for simple effects
revealed that RT was significantly longer for the cue specifying an
FP of 1.5 s (247 ms) than for either the neutral cue (234 ms), F(l,
11) = 9.70, MSE = 1,895.03, p < .01, or the cue specifying an FP
of 1.0 s (238 ms), F(l, 11) = 10.25, MSE = 855.45,p < .01. The
RTs for the neutral cue and the cue specifying an FP of 1.0 s did
not differ significantly, F(l, 11) = 2.41, MSE = 730.68, p > .10.
Table 2 shows PE as a function of cue type (neutral, valid, or
invalid), FPn (0.5, 1.0, or 1.5 s), and FPn_! (0.5, 1.0, or 1.5 s). An
ANOVA performed on these data revealed no significant main
effects, but there were significant interactions between FPn and
FPn_!, F(4, 44) = 3.18, MSE = 2.15,p < .05; between FPn_! and
cue type, F(4, 44) = 2.74, MSE = 2.01, p < .05; and among FPn,
FPn_,, and cue type, F(8, 88) = 4.00, MSE = 1.49, p < .01. All
of these interactions basically reflect a strong increase in PE with
FP^_! for the shortest ¥Pn in the neutral-cue condition, whereas
PE varied much less across FPn_, in other conditions.
Discussion
Experiment 3 replicated the central findings of the two preced-
ing experiments. Specifically, the effect of FPn_, for the shortest
FPn was considerably smaller in the valid-cue condition than in
either the neutral-cue condition or the invalid-cue condition, con-
sistent with the findings of Experiments 1 and 2, respectively.
Furthermore, beyond the shortest FPn, there were only minimal
effects of FPn_, or cue type, consistent with the findings of both
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. As before, we focus in what
follows on the findings for the shortest FPn.
In addition to replicating earlier findings, Experiment 3 yielded
two strong indications that participants consistently prepared for
action at the critical moment specified by the informative cue.
First, the effect of FPn_j was almost reduced to zero in the
valid-cue condition, which reveals intentional preparation for ac-
tion at the correctly specified imperative moment. The residual
effect was considerably less pronounced than that observed in
Experiment 2, which suggests that the higher proportion of valid
cues in Experiment 3 encouraged participants to base their prepa-
ratory strategy on the informative cue. In fact, the residual effect
was approximately equal to that observed in Experiment 1, in
which the cue was always valid. This suggests that the informative
cue was treated as if it were always valid. Second, relative to the
neutral-cue condition, there was a general RT cost in the invalid-
cue condition. This finding is important because it makes it un-
likely that participants allowed their preparatory strategy to depend
on the FP specified by the informative cue. For instance, one such
strategy would be to prepare on the basis of the cue when it
specifies the shortest FP, reasoning that there is time for reprepa-
ration if the cue proves invalid, but to ignore the cue when it
specifies a longer FP so as to avoid slow responding when the
earliest critical moment becomes imperative. However, if this were
the strategy participants followed, there is no basis for the RT cost
in the invalid-cue condition relative to the neutral-cue condition.
The finding that this cost occurred for the invalid cue specifying an
FP of 1.5 s but not for an invalid cue specifying an FP of 1.0 s is
taken up in the General Discussion section.
Because participants consistently prepared on the basis of the
informative cue, the results of Experiment 3 favor the conditioning
view of nonspecific preparation over the strategic view. According
to the strategic view, the effect of FPn_, observed in the neutral-
cue condition indicates that uncertainty about the impending FP
induces a strategy of preparing for action at the critical moment
that was imperative on the preceding trial. Therefore, a strong
reduction of this effect should be observed when participants
prepare on the basis of the informative cue, regardless of its
validity. However, as Figure 5A shows, the effect of FPn_j in the
invalid-cue condition clearly exceeded that in the valid-cue con-
dition. By contrast, according to the conditioning view, the effect
of FPn_ j in the neutral-cue condition reflects the participant's state
of nonspecific preparation as it is adjusted by a process of trace
conditioning. This conditioning effect may be obscured in the
valid-cue condition, when intentional preparation contributes to
the state of nonspecific preparation at the imperative moment, but
should recur in the invalid-cue condition, when intentional prep-
aration is distracted to a critical moment beyond the imperative
moment. This is in agreement with the observation that the effect
of FPn_i was about as large in the invalid-cue condition as in the
neutral-cue condition.
General Discussion
This study tested two views of the nature of nonspecific prep-
aration: the strategic view and the conditioning view. These views
differ with respect to the role of intention in the within-trial
development of the state of nonspecific preparation corresponding
to a critical moment. According to the strategic view, this devel-
opment requires an intentional preparatory process that is guided
by the expectancy of the participant as to which of several critical
moments is going to be imperative on a given trial (e.g., Alegria,
1975; Gottsdanker, 1975; Niemi & Naatanen, 1981). By contrast,
according to the conditioning view, the development of the pre-
paratory state is identified with a conditioned response that is
unintentionally elicited by WS (Los, 1996; Los et al., 2001).
To dissociate intentional and unintentional contributions to the
state of nonspecific preparation, we first assessed to what extent
participants are capable of intentional preparation for action at a
moment specified by a cue. Experiment 1 showed that participants
are indeed very capable of doing this. As compared with perfor-
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mance in a neutral-cue control condition, a valid cue caused a
near elimination of sequential effects in mixed blocks as well as
a strong reduction of the RT difference between pure and mixed
blocks. Although these findings show that intentional prepara-
tion can contribute to the state of nonspecific preparation, they
do not imply that the effects of FP observed in the neutral-cue
condition originate from a similar preparatory process. It is
perfectly possible that the provision of a valid cue encourages
participants to make an intentional contribution to a state of
nonspecific preparation that is normally regulated by condition-
ing processes alone. To examine this hypothesis, we added
invalid cues on a small proportion of the trials in Experiments 2
and 3. In both experiments, sequential effects proved stronger
in the invalid-cue condition than in the valid-cue condition. In
particular, the results of Experiment 3 showed that whereas
sequential effects were almost eliminated in the valid-cue con-
dition, they were as strong in the invalid-cue condition as in the
neutral-cue control condition. Thus, it appears that sequential
effects occur when the focus of intentional preparation is dis-
tracted from the imperative moment. This dissociation of an
unintentional contribution to the state of nonspecific prepara-
tion from an intentional one is predicted by the conditioning
view but not by the strategic view.
In conclusion, the present findings suggest that intentional con-
trol is not the hallmark of nonspecific preparation during FP and
that the maintenance of nonspecific preparation is not well char-
acterized as an "aversive state" (Gottsdanker, 1975; Naatanen,
1972). Instead, the data indicate that nonspecific preparation is
regulated unintentionally by a process of trace conditioning. Even
though we have shown that an intentional preparatory process can
contribute to the state of nonspecific preparation, participants seem
to make this contribution only when explicitly encouraged to do
so. In other cases, the intentions of the participant do not seem to
pertain to the timing of IS.
Evidence for Path Independence
A basic assumption underlying our experimental approach was
what is sometimes called path independence (e.g., Roberts, 1998,
p. 72). According to this assumption, behavior is a function of the
magnitude of some internal state, irrespective of how that state was
reached. Applied to our case, RT is a function of the state of
nonspecific preparation and not of the relative contribution of
conditioning processes and strategic processes to this state. The
findings of the present study were consistent with this assumption.
To observe fast responding it proved sufficient to have a strong
contribution of either the conditioning process or the strategic
process, whereas to observe slow responding it was necessary that
both of these contributions were low.
Converging evidence for path independence was recently ob-
tained by Coull, Frith, Biichel, and Nobre (2000) using functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). The experimental design in
their study was basically the same as in the present study, with two
FPs, of 600 and 1,400 ms, presented in mixed blocks of trials and
a cue specifying the impending FP with a valid-invalid ratio of
4:1. The behavioral findings were consistent with the present
findings. In the valid-cue condition, RT was about equal for short
and long FPs; in the invalid-cue condition, however, RT was
considerably longer for the short FP than for the long FP. Sequen-
tial effects were not reported. The fMRI data revealed different
anatomical areas underlying motor preparation, as identified by
comparing brain activation in the short and long FP conditions (for
valid cues only), and temporal orientation, as identified by com-
paring brain activation in the valid-cue and invalid-cue conditions
(averaged across FP). Motor preparation involved the left anterior
putamen, the bilateral thalamus, and the supplementary motor area,
whereas temporal orientation involved the inferior premotor-
prefrontal and orbitofrontal cortex bilaterally, the left insula, and
the left inferior parietal cortex. The differential implication of
prefrontal areas in these two activities led Coull et al. to conclude
that motor preparation is essentially an unintentional, bottom-up
process, whereas temporal orientation is an intentional, top-down
process. They stated that "although motor preparation or timing
may be intimately linked to temporal attentional orienting from a
conceptual viewpoint, anatomically they can be dissociated"
(Coull et al., 2000, p. 816). Perhaps, then, our interpretation
of motor preparation (i.e., as reflected by sequential effects
of FP) in terms of conditioning processes provides the missing
link in a conceptual framework corresponding to this anatomical
distinction.
Finally, regarding the intentional contribution to the state of
nonspecific preparation, the picture we have drawn is probably
not complete. In both Experiments 2 and 3, we observed that,
for the shortest FP, RT was slower when the invalid cue
specified an FP of 1.5 s than when it specified an FP of 1.0 s.
Importantly, in both experiments this effect was additive to the
effect of FPK_1. A possible interpretation of this finding, sug-
gested by application of the additive-factors method (Sternberg,
1969), is that the specific invalid cue affects a nonmotor
stage of information processing. Again, brain-imaging studies
lend some support to this interpretation. In their fMRI study,
Coull et al. (2000) observed exclusively in visual-cortex areas
a stronger effect of cue validity when FP was short than
when it was long (see Miniussi, Wilding, Coull, & Nobre, 1999,
for converging evidence from brain potentials). From these
findings, Coull et al. inferred that an unexpectedly early IS
exogenously affects a sensory mechanism. This suggests that,
for the invalid cues in our study, perceptual processing may
have lasted longer as IS occurred earlier than specified by
the cue.
Assessment of the Conditioning View
Although the major findings of this study provide fundamen-
tal support for the conditioning view of nonspecific preparation,
we have come across several additional findings that were
inconsistent with the specific model we proposed. First, all of
the experiments showed that RT for the shortest FP was longer
when the longest FP occurred on the preceding trial than when
the middle FP occurred on the preceding trial. The model does
not predict this result, because it does not assume that the extent
to which a critical moment is bypassed makes any difference to
the state of conditioning corresponding to that moment. Second,
even though all the experiments showed the expected increase
in RT when the imperative moment was bypassed during FP on
the preceding trial, this increase was much more pronounced for
the earliest critical moment than for the middle critical moment.
Again, the model does not predict this result, because the
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distance between a critical moment and WS is not expected to
modify the force of extinction when that critical moment is
bypassed during FP. Third, the experiments also showed that, if
anything, RT for the middle FP was longer when the predicting
trial contained the same FP than when it contained a shorter FP.
The model predicted the converse tendency, in view of its
assumption that the state of conditioning corresponding to a
critical moment increases when that moment is imperative,
whereas it is left unchanged when IS occurs earlier than that
critical moment.
As a first step toward a solution to these problems, it is useful
to realize that these findings may have a common underlying
source: the assumption that extinction and reinforcement oper-
ate on the state of conditioning corresponding to a critical
moment in an all-or-none fashion. Figure 6 reflects this assump-
tion by showing the dynamics of extinction and reinforcement
during a single trial. Clearly, adjacent critical moments do not
share consequences of extinction or reinforcement; that is, there
is no coupling between their corresponding states of condition-
ing. As a result, this model has difficulties accounting for the
gradual effects discussed earlier. To account for these effects, it
is desirable to allow some coupling among the states of condi-
tioning corresponding to adjacent critical moments, as is also
assumed in many formal models in the literature on trace
conditioning (e.g., Gallistel & Gibbon, 2000; Grossberg
& Merrill, 1992; Grossberg & Schmajuk, 1989; Machado,
1997).
In particular, the learning rules of the conditioning model
under present examination are very similar to those of Macha-
do's (1997) formal model, the major difference being that the
influences of extinction and reinforcement are smeared over the
time scale under Machado's model. After some adjustment, Los
et al. (2001) fitted Machado's model to a representative data set
of FP effects, similar to the one of this study, and obtained a
reasonably good fit. It is beyond the scope of this article to
provide a complete account of this formal model. Instead, we
indicate which modifications should be made to the original
conditioning model to make it globally consistent with that of
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Machado.4 Next, we indicate how the revised model accounts
for the problematic findings raised earlier.
Figure 6B shows the revised conditioning model. According to
this model, the state of conditioning corresponding to each critical
moment is continuously subject to extinction during FP. The
strength of extinction at any point in time during FP, t, on the state
of conditioning corresponding to a critical moment, C, is inversely
related to the distance between t and C. By integrating these
extinction values across FP, the total quantity of extinction at the
end of FP is obtained for each state of conditioning. Thus, even
though the states of conditioning are all extinguished in parallel
during FP, the revised model maintains the notion of the original
model that a state of conditioning is subject to much stronger
extinction when its corresponding critical moment is bypassed
during FP than when it is not bypassed during FP (Figure 6B, top).
Next, on the presentation of IS, reinforcement takes over. Rein-
forcement is maximal for the state of conditioning corresponding
to the imperative moment and tapers off toward earlier and later
critical moments as they are more remote from the imperative
moment (Figure 6B, middle). This yields a net state of condition-
ing after the trial as depicted in the bottom panel of Figure 6B.
Clearly, under the revised model, adjacent critical moments
share to some extent the consequences of extinction and reinforce-
ment, resulting in a coupling of their corresponding states of
conditioning.
Two more specific properties emanate from Machado's (1997)
model. First, for a given distance between two critical moments,
the strength of coupling between their states of conditioning in-
creases when these critical moments are more remote from WS.
For instance, in an experiment with two FPs, a stronger coupling
would be predicted for FPs of 1.5 s and 2.0 s than for FPs of 1.0 s
and 1.5 s. Second, extinction and reinforcement are governed by a
law of diminishing returns: The higher the state of conditioning,
the stronger its resistance to further increase, and the lower
the state of conditioning, the stronger the resistance to further
decrease.5
The revised model accounts for the problematic findings raised
earlier in the following way. First, the finding that responding at
the earliest critical moment is slower when the longest FP occurred
on the preceding trial than when the middle FP occurred on the
preceding trial is accounted for by the gradual impact of extinction
and reinforcement processes across the time scale. As the distance
between two critical moments becomes larger, there is a decreased
coupling between their corresponding states of conditioning. Spe-
cifically, as a critical moment is further bypassed during FP, its
corresponding state of conditioning is subject to extinction during
a longer time and shares less in subsequent reinforcement.
Second, the finding that RT for the middle FP is relatively
unaffected by the occurrence of the longest FP on the preceding
trial is accounted for by the assumption that the coupling between
states of conditioning increases with their remoteness from WS.
According to this assumption, there is a stronger coupling between
the states of conditioning corresponding to the middle and latest
critical moments than between those corresponding to the earliest
and middle critical moments. That is, there is a smaller difference
between the consequences of extinction and reinforcement for the
states of conditioning corresponding to the middle and latest
critical moments when the latest critical moment is imperative than
for the states of conditioning corresponding to the earliest and
middle critical moments when the middle critical moment is
imperative.
Third, the finding that for the middle critical moment the gain of
being repeated is less pronounced than the gain of being preceded
by the earliest critical moment is accounted for by adding the
assumption of the law of diminishing returns. According to this
assumption, the "pulling force" of extinction and reinforcement
processes is scaled by the initial state of conditioning at the start of
the trial: If the state of conditioning is high, extinction will be
relatively strong; if it is low, reinforcement will be relatively
strong. Thus, if the state of conditioning corresponding to a critical
moment is high, it may well turn out that it receives more net
reinforcement (or less net extinction) when IS is presented just
before that critical moment than when it is presented precisely at
that critical moment. In the latter case, the additional extinction
during the final phase of FP may outweigh the advantage of
stronger subsequent reinforcement.
In conclusion, even though the problematic findings of this
study reveal some shortcomings of the original conditioning
model, they do not jeopardize the conditioning view in general.
As the preceding analysis shows, it is possible to remedy these
shortcomings in a way that is consistent with general assump-
tions deriving from formal models of trace conditioning
(e.g., Grossberg & Merrill, 1992; Grossberg & Schmajuk, 1989;
Machado, 1997; see Los et al., 2001, for further dis-
cussion).
Deviations From the Standard FP Design
Our focus in this article has been on a design involving a
rectangular distribution of FPs of 0.5, 1.0, and 1.5 s in mixed
blocks. In this section, we discuss two common deviations from
this design: (a) effects of probability imbalance and (b) effects of
range and mean FP.
Probability imbalance refers to any deviation from a uniform FP
distribution in mixed blocks, such that some FPs occur more
frequently than others. Most important in this respect is the non-
aging FP distribution, for which the conditional probability of IS
4
 From our conceptual viewpoint, the model we are about to describe is
perhaps not the simplest way to account for the problematic results under
examination. It may be simplest to assume that the state of nonspecific
preparation results from a summation of the activation values of the
individual states of conditioning at any point in time. Even though the
individual states of conditioning remain this way uncoupled, a coupling is
realized at the level of nonspecific preparation to the extent that adjacent
states of conditioning overlap. On the other hand, the model we describe
shortly has the merit of giving an impression of a mathematically well-
formulated model that has been successfully applied in animal learning
(Machado, 1997) and FP effects in humans (Los et al., 2001).
5
 It may seem that many assumptions are needed to account for the
problematic findings under examination. However, this should be attrib-
uted to the fact that we describe a mathematical model from our conceptual
viewpoint (cf. Footnote 4). Starting from the mathematical model, a dif-
ferent set of assumptions obtains as implicated in a simple system of
differential equations. Moreover, it may be recalled that the strategic model
as presented in the introduction also fails to account for the problematic
findings, and it may well turn out to be difficult to develop the strategic
model to such a degree that it makes predictions with the same accuracy as
the revised conditioning model.
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presentation remains equal from the onset of WS onward. Several
studies have shown that a nonaging FP distribution causes the
RT-FP function to flatten considerably (e.g., Granjon, Requin,
Dump, & Reynard, 1973; Naatanen, 1971). The strategic view
provides a straightforward interpretation of this result: An increase
in the (conditional) probability of IS presentation at a critical
moment encourages participants to enhance their state of prepara-
tion for that moment. Thus, responding at the earliest critical
moment is faster for nonaging FPs than for aging FPs, because of
a higher probability that IS is presented at the earliest critical
moment. However, the conditioning view provides an equally
plausible account of these data: Raising the probability of IS
presentation at a specific critical moment leads to more frequent
reinforcement of the corresponding state of conditioning. Thus,
responding at the earliest critical moment is faster for nonaging
than for aging FPs, because this moment is relatively often re-
peated, causing its corresponding state of conditioning to remain
high.
Along these lines of reasoning, the conditioning model also
readily accounts for other effects of probability imbalance. For
example, Alegria (1975) and Baumeister and Joubert (1969) used
a rectangular FP distribution as well as distributions that were
skewed to the left (i.e., a prevalence of long FPs) and skewed to the
right (i.e., a prevalence of short FPs). Both studies revealed that
mean RT for the shortest FP was shortest when the distribution
was skewed to the right. It is important that, in both studies, this
effect was found to be largely if not completely due to sequential
effects. Thus, apart from the strategic view advocated by Alegria,
a conditioning view offers a plausible account of these data.
The second deviation from the standard FP design concerns the
effects of FP range and average FP. Elliot (1973) presented five
FPs in mixed blocks with FP ranges of 2, 6, or 10 s and an average
FP of either 6 or 12 s. He observed that for any average FP, the
larger the FP range, the larger the FP effect on RT; also, for any FP
range, the larger the average FP, the smaller the FP effect on RT.
Taking the strategic perspective, Elliot argued that, for a given
average FP, increasing the FP range makes it more difficult to
maintain readiness to respond, resulting in larger FP effects on RT.
In turn, for a given FP range, decreasing the average FP makes the
different critical moments more discriminable and, with that, more
accessible to distinct preparatory activity, resulting in larger FP
effects on RT. However, these findings also naturally derive from
the conditioning view. According to the revised conditioning
model developed in the previous section, increasing the distance
between adjacent critical moments implies a reduction of the
coupling of their corresponding states of conditioning. Because of
this uncoupling, increasing the FP range results in a more pro-
nounced effect of FP on RT. The revised conditioning model also
assumes that increasing the average FP results in a stronger cou-
pling of the states of conditioning corresponding to the critical
moments. Therefore, increasing the average FP reduces the effect
of FP.
In conclusion, the (revised) conditioning model not only ac-
counts for FP effects deriving from the design used in the present
study. It also accounts for effects deriving from frequently encoun-
tered deviations from this design with respect to probability im-
balance, FP range, and mean FP.
Conclusion
Since the early work of Woodrow (1914), not much progress has
been made in specifying a mechanism underlying nonspecific
preparation during the FP. We believe that the cause of this
stagnation may well be the widespread idea that nonspecific prep-
aration is necessarily an intentional process. We think that much
more progress may be possible by assuming that nonspecific
preparation, as reflected by FP effects, is regulated unintentionally
by the learning rules of trace conditioning. In this article, we have
presented evidence for the unintentional nature of nonspecific
preparation by demonstrating that classical effects of FP occur
even when the intention of the participant is distracted from the
imperative moment.
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